Contrary to the widespread belief that game repetition induces conciliatory behavior, in a repeated battle of the sexes where player 1 values the future and player 2 is myopic, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting behavior to risk a conflict in the present when the future is important, and/or there are many periods left in the game.
or conflicting behavior when players have incomplete information 1 about how tough they are? Are the players indifferent to the discount factor? Which role does the number of game repetitions play? This article answers these questions.
Players 1 and 2 have discount factors 0Vd 1 V1 and d 2 =0, which means that player 2 is 100% myopic.
2 Consider (a 1 ,a 2 )=(4,3) preferred by row player 1, the starting point of our analysis, by assuming that both players have a common conjecture that they will both play their first strategy. Column player 2 has an incentive to switch strategy from I to II. Player 1 resists switching from I to II in each period with a probability of 0Va 1 V1, which expresses how tough player 1 is. If he is tough, the threat point (t 1 ,t 2 ) is reached where both are worse off. Player 1 is weak with a probability of 1Àa 1 , and resists only when his expected payoff from resisting is larger than when acquiescing. If player 1 is weak, player 2's preferred (b 1 ,b 2 )=(3,4) is reached. Player 1 gets to know player 2's choice before he chooses.
3
In a one-period game, player 1 acquiesces to a challenge if he is weak. A weak player 2 thus challenges when:
Player 2 is tough with a probability of 0Va 2 V1 (is 100% certain to challenge) and weak with a probability of 1Àa 2 (challenges only when his expected payoff from challenging is larger than when not challenging). In a two-period game, a weak player 1 acquiesces in period 1 when:
On the left side of the inequality in Eq. (2), the term d 1 a 2 b 1 follows since a weak player 1 acquiesces in period 2 to a tough player 2, which emerges with a probability of a 2 . A weak player 2 challenges in period 1 when Eq. (1) is satisfied, and acquiesces otherwise. He challenges in period 2 if player 1 acquiesces in period 1, and does not challenge in period 2 if player 1 resists in period 1. When Eq. (1) is not satisfied, the weak player 1 resists with probability 1 in period 1, and the weak player 2 does not Table 1 Two-person two-strategy game
challenge in period 1. When Eq. (1) is satisfied, the weak player 1 randomizes, which requires that when player 1 resists in period 1, the weak player 2 randomizes in a way that makes the weak player 1 indifferent in his randomizing in period 1. This requires that the posterior probability that player 1 is tough, conditional on fighting, equals Eq. (1) as an equality i.e., a 1 =(b 2 Àa 2 )/(b 2 Àt 2 ). Defining b as the conditional probability that a weak player 1 resists in period 1, applying Bayes' rule gives:
The total probability that player 1 resists in period 1 is:
Applying analogous reasoning to that leading to Eq. (1), a weak player 2 challenges in period 1 when:
and acquiesces otherwise. In a three-period game where a 1 N((b 2 Àa 2 )/(b 2 Àt 2 )) 2 , a weak player 1 resists a challenge and a weak player 2 does not challenge. If ((b 2 Àa 2 )/(b 2 Àt 2 ))
2 , a weak player 1 randomizes and a weak player 2 does not challenge. If a 1 b((b 2 Àa 2 )/ (b 2 Àt 2 )) 3 , a weak player 1 randomizes and a weak player 2 challenges. In a finitely repeated game, a weak player 2 does not challenge until the first period where N periods remain and:
Hence, the size of a 1 required to deter a challenge 4 from player 2, when a 2 is sufficiently small, shrinks geometrically at the rate (b 2 Àa 2 )/(b 2 Àt 2 ) as N increases. When N is large even a very small a 1 may deter the challenge. A weak player 1 deters the challenge when 5 
Eqs. (6) and (7) establish, uniquely dependent on a 1 and a 2 , how the game is played and which payoffs (a 1 ,a 2 ), (t 1 ,t 2 ), and (b 1 ,b 2 ) accrue to the players in each period. Player 2 challenges when player 1's toughness a 1 is low. Player 1 resists when player 2's toughness a 2 is low (see Table 2 ).
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate with numbers in Table 1 . a 1 (N) is independent of d 1 , and decreases in N. Player 2's challenge does not depend on d 1 (due to myopia). When many periods N remain, player 2 does not challenge even when a 1 is small, although decreasing a 1 further causes player 2 to challenge. a 2 (N,d 1 ) increases in both N and d 1 . Player 1 resists the challenge when a 2 is low. As N or d 1 increases, player 1 resists the challenge even when a 2 is high, but not when too high.
The equilibrium strategies are: player 2 either challenges always (a 1 is low), or starts the challenge in period 2 or thereafter (a 1 is intermediate), or challenges never (a 1 is high). Player 1 either resists always (a 2 is low), or resists halfway through the game and thereafter acquiesces (a 2 is intermediate), or acquiesces in all periods (a 2 is high).
Eq. (7) expresses that for a given a 2 , player 1 is more inclined to resist a challenge when the future is important (d 1 is large) and the game has many periods (N is large). The myopic player 2 is, for a given a 1 , more inclined to challenge the fewer periods N left of the game. Inserting N=2 and N=l into Eq. (7) gives Eqs. (2) and (8), respectively. When N=l, player 1 deters the challenge in an infinitely repeated game when:
Summing up, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting behavior and deterrence to risk a conflict in the present when the future is more important (d 1 is large), and/or there are many periods N left in the game, given that player 2 is sufficiently inclined not to challenge (a 2 is small).
